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October 13, 2005
Covered
Call Analysis - A Delphic Lesson
by John Brasher, CallWriter Publisher
| A few weeks ago auto parts giant Delphi
Corp. (DPH) was at the top of our Real Time Lists™ of
the top covered calls, with a very nice return. The
company's fall in fortunes over the last few weeks illustrates
the importance of examining the news before writing covered
calls on a stock. This issue provides an object lesson in
how to spot the problem trades when you see them.
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Our Real Time
Lists™ present the highest-returning covered call trade setups,
arranged according to potential return. Delphi was approximately
$6.30 at the time it first hit our lists in late August, offering
a return well over 5% for less than a 30-day trade. For that matter,
it hit the lists of every other online service that offers covered
call lists. The stock soon began to decline after first hitting
the lists. On Saturday, October 8th, Delphi filed for Chapter 11
protection; the previous day the stock had dropped from $2.20 to
$1.12, and this week traded down to $0.23, although it has since
bounced back slightly. That's a loss of roughly 95% of its value
from its appearance on the lists. It has dropped from the New York
Stock Exchange to the over-the-counter Pink Sheets and now trades
as DPHIQ. Delphi inherited a lot of problems when spun off from
parent General Motors (GM), and I believe it will come back (a large
hedge fund bought 9% of Delphi this week, so others believe as I
do). But right now it's in the gutter and a speculative play.
It was a magnificent
downside play, perfect for shorts and not bad for put buyers, but
not a good stock for covered calls. The question is, how does a
covered call writer avoid such a stock? Were there warning signs
that would have steered a prudent trader away from Delphi?
It is important
to know where the highest returns are, but that is just the starting
point. Each trade has to be evaluated. I have always stressed the
need for analyzing potential covered call writes before hitting
the trade button, and the educational materials on CallWriter go
into this subject in great detail. Actually, there were numerous
warning signs for Delphi. Even though it is no fun talking about
plays from our list that later sold off, it is instructive to look
closely at them, because there are vital covered call lessons to
be learned. Over the years I've learned far more from the stocks
that withered than from the shining successes. Though I was not
in Delphi, I nonetheless have learned much from it. That is the
purpose of this newsletter issue - I want you to learn from it,
also. So let's tear into Delphi as it presented when first hitting
our lists.
Profitability:
Delphi, which does $28 billion annually, lost $338 million for
Q2 2005 (including a $49 million charge for restructuring), compared
to a $143 million profit for the same quarter 2004. The future
outlook under its current labor agreements with the UAW is not
good.
Chart:
in late August, Delphi hit its highest point since early March
2005; it looked to be in a nice uptrend on a daily chart until
it started falling on the news. Delphi really underlines the importance
of looking at longer-term charts, also, because It was in a long-term
downtrend on a weekly chart - and it was clear on the weekly chart
that the August advance was really a failure to get back to the
long-term trendline. The chart below illustrates the length and
depth of Delphi's decline.

Financial
Health: Delphi has $17.1 billion in assets but $22.2 billion
in debit. Spun off from General Motors in 1999, Delphi inherited
from GM an abysmal union labor cost structure of high salaries
and high benefit levels, plus high pension payments to retired
workers and an unfunded pension liability. I'm not pro- or anti-union,
but only a company in the prime of health can afford top-tier
compensation and benefit packages, which for Delphi amount currently
to about $65 hourly per worker. Getting a D- in profitability
and an F in financial health, this company was not a good choice
for covered call writing. In fact, this company dramatizes
the importance of looking at financial health even of giant companies,
which are not exempt from laws of financial gravity.
Business
Profile: While Delphi is a robust company, General Motors
accounts for 50% of its business. Any decline in GM's fortunes
(which are not so good, either) would carry Delphi down with it,
and any cutback in orders or worse, cancellation of the business
relationship; this reliance factor worries me about any company.
Almost any discussion of Delphi dwelled upon its excessive reliance
on GM.
Relative
Strength: Delphi has for years under-performed the DJIA
and S&P 500 indices, and its own industry, and has grossly
under-performed them in 2004. When looking for covered call candidates
you are looking for strength or for the company to at least hold
its own, certainly not a company weaker than the overall market
or its industry. A good place to check this instantly is to use
the CallWriter Research Page, click on the stock symbol and view
the comparative performance chart in the Snapshot window that
opens.
News:
Delphi has been in trouble for some time. At the time it first
appeared on our lists, news commentators were already talking
about Delphi's need to restructure its labor package in order
to survive, let alone prosper. And Delphi management was publicly
mulling over the Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization option as
a way to bring the unions to the bargaining table. In fact, it
was clear at the time that Delphi would make a Chapter 11 filing
if it failed to get the concessions.
Although
a Chapter 11 filing may in the long run clear Delphi's decks and
make a return to profitability possible (lifting the stock price
considerably), in the short run it is poison for the stock price.
Investors remember how, not that long ago, K-Mart went into Chapter
11 and its existing shareholders got wiped out. This draconian
possibility exists, which is why in my mind Delphi is not a buy
at its current price. It is a buy only for speculators. Buyers
run from a stock with a realistic prospect of filing Chapter 11.
This prospect alone made Delphi a no-go for covered calls or any
strategy involving long stock! Once the Chapter 11 possibility
emerged, nothing else mattered for a covered call writer, even
if Delphi had otherwise presented as a good covered write candidate.
Be very clear
on this: despite the fact that a company's call premiums may offer
good returns, when it is the subject of news stories that could
foreshadow a catastrophic drop (especially when the company is the
source of the the news), you stay away from it - no ifs, ands or
buts. News of this kind is the rattler's rattle. No covered
call management strategy can cope with a selloff of this magnitude.
Those stuck in Delphi as it sold off can only take the loss or hold
on in hopes of a recovery, which could take a long time and is not
assured - if the common stock is not canceled.
Let's recap
at this point: a company with failing financial grades, losing big
money, its stock in a long-term decline as shown on a weekly chart,
significantly under-performing its industry and the major stock
indices. Add to that management's public threats to file a Chapter
11in an attempt to bring the unions to heel.
The question
is not so much what should have warned us away from it, but what
factors other than the high return ever would have enticed a trader
to put the Delphi covered call trade on. One did not need a Delphic
Oracle to steer clear of it. Thus Delphi is not an object lesson
in the dangers of covered call writing. It is instead a lesson in
the need to take a careful look at each company before squeezing
the trade trigger.
Avoiding this
kind of situation is not a matter of arcane skills in reading the
tea leaves on a stock. Simple trade discipline would have sufficed
to keep you out of Delphi. It is when traders lose that discipline,
don't look at fundamentals, perhaps don't bother to scan the news,
perhaps just glance over a daily chart and ignore the larger trend,
that real losses occur. It is not difficult to avoid companies whose
rattles are buzzing like Delphi's were.
This
issue's Question and Answer:
P/E - Useful Measure of Stock Value?
Question:
Johnny, I know that P/E is a highly popular method of valuing
stocks. Do you believe it is useful for measuring a company's value
or that it is a basis for selecting good covered call stocks?
Answer:
No. The price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio is the most widely used stock
valuation metrics among professional analysts and individual investors
alike. It is calculated as the company's stock price divided by
its earnings per share. A stock’s P/E is easy to understand
and is published daily in newspaper stock tables. Its apparent simplicity
and ready availability play a major role in its popularity. But
investors are interested in whether a company's stock is undervalued
(and thus perhaps a good investment), fairly valued or overvalued
(a poor investment). Unfortunately, P/E offers no way to divine
this.
Current earnings
or lack of earnings can be due to accounting tricks or to extraordinary
(one-time) events. Who knows, earnings might even fairly present
the company's results! But companies use a lot of different accounting
"techniques" to manage earnings. But even if accurate,
current earnings are no guide at all to the company's prospects
and to whether it will produce added value in the future. Here's
an example: suppose we look at three hypthetical companies in the
same industry, each growing revenues and making money according
to their SEC filings, each with a P/E multiple of 10. The P/E multiple
provides absolutely no hint that the first company’s growth
adds no value, that the next adds substantial growth-related value,
and that the third's growth will over time destroy value. In other
words, the first company is fairly valued, the second is undervalued
and the third overvalued. The P/E multiple offers no means to discriminate
among the three companies.
For covered
call writing, I tend to avoid companies with really high P/E ratios,
which will be the subject of a forthcoming newsletter. This is why
I put the P/E on our lists - not to use in selecting trades but
as a guide to whether it is overheated or not. A low P/E does not
necessarily signal a good covered call candidate. But I would never
look at P/E by itself to try to determine a stock's worth for investment
or any other purpose, because it doesn't provide that information.
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